

1STGR43/A16-3
Serial: 026

278

Reg. No.	349
U.S. No.	6 05019

CONFIDENTIAL

12 June 1945.

From: Commander LST Group FORTY-THREE.
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) Commander LST Flotilla FIFTEEN (CTU 78.1.18).
(2) Commander Amphibious Group SIX (CTG 78.1).
(3) Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force (CTF 78).
(4) Commander SEVENTH Fleet.

Subject: Action Report - OBOE SIX Operation - Morotai to
Brunei Bay, Borneo.

References: (a) Article 874(6), U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920.
(b) Com7thPhib C/L Serial 0563 of 10 March 1945.
(c) ComPhibGroupSIX C/L Serial 0241 of 31 May 1945.
(d) ComPhibGroupSIX Attack Order No. A606-45.
(e) ComPhibGroupSIX Movement and Approach Order
No. A605-45.
(f) ComLSTFlot15 Landing Attack Order No. 1-45.

Enclosures: (A) Loading Report for LSTs of Assault Unit White. - p.5
(B) Disposition of Ships in Cruising Formation No. 6. - p.7
(C) Disposition of Ships in Approach Formation No. 6. - p.8

PART I.

Ships included in Commander Amphibious Group SIX Attack Order No. A606-45 left Morotai at 1230 on 4 June 1945 and formed in cruising formation No. 6 (Enclosure (B)). Commander Amphibious Group SIX (CTG 78.1) in USS ROCKY MOUNT was Officer in Tactical Command of the formation, using his flagship as guide.

The destination of this Task Organization was Brunei Bay, Borneo, on a mission of amphibious assault landings at three points; (1) on southern coast of Labuan Island in vicinity of Victoria Harbor (Brown Beach), (2) on the mainland in vicinity of Cape Polompong and Bitang (Green Beach), and (3) on Maura Island (White Beach). All landings were to be made simultaneously at 0915 (I) on 10 June 1945.

Preliminary bombardment by Navy and Army Air Force was scheduled and carried out according to reference (d). Minesweeping and demolition units were also provided for in the same reference. Reports received prior to the invasion showed good results obtained from all preliminary operations with almost negligible opposition.

130225

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Action Report - OBOE SIX Operation - Morotai to
Brunei Bay, Borneo.

PART II.

Upon getting underway ships were assigned positions and times for reaching the rendezvous point. When the signal from the Officer in Tactical Command to form Cruising Formation No. 6 was executed, ships took their relative positions from the guide (USS ROCKY MOUNT). This formation, with slight variations when in dangerous waters, was maintained until the signal was received to form Approach Formation No. 6 at 1630 on 9 June. The position of White Assault Unit was as shown in enclosures (A) and (B).

Enroute to objective there was no actual contact with enemy forces. Reports of radar and sound contacts were received from escort vessels, but none of these reports developed into attacks by the enemy.

Upon reaching point Pork (05-08-00 N, 115-04-00 E) units of Brown Assault Unit and Green Assault Unit proceeded to their respective areas and Commander LST Group FORTY-THREE was assigned tactical command of White Assault Unit. Courses were followed in compliance with the scheduled route to White Assault area. At point Steak (05-04-57 N, 115-10-00 E) Commander Transport Division 103 was ordered to detach his unit of 5 APDs and proceed via alternate route to Point Frankfurter (05-01-30 N, 115-10-48 E). The remainder of White Assault Unit proceeded in a two column formation to White Assault area. Upon reaching point Frankfurter this unit was ordered to proceed independently to areas previously directed.

The order to "Land the Landing Craft" came at 0805 and LSTs 751, 667 and 584 immediately commenced launching LVTs and LCVPs assigned for assault waves into White Beach. The dispatching station on the line of departure for boat waves was controlled by Commander Task Unit 78.1.43 and waves one, two and three were dispatched on schedule. During preliminary arrangements and lining up of boat waves, the support unit of LCIs made runs and fired rockets along the beach line of White Beach. Bombardment from larger ships was being conducted from outside the immediate area. As the boat waves approached the line of departure and were dispatched, the second assault of rocket firing craft approached the target area. Simultaneous bombardment of the beaching area was carried out by rocket firing craft, larger vessels guns, and six B-24s bombs. The order to lift the firing away from the beach was signaled by two red smoke flares when the first wave was 800 yards from the beach. All firing from the LCIs did not cease immediately upon signal causing a slight hesitancy in the first wave to hit the beach.

There was no enemy opposition encountered on White Beach and landing waves proceeded inland immediately. When Red Beach, which joined White Beach to the South, was pronounced secure, Commander LST Group FORTY-THREE proceeded there to carry out his duties as LST Beaching Officer, Red Beach.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Action Report - OBOE SIX Operation - Morotai to
Brunei Bay, Borneo.

Due to unsatisfactory beaching conditions between piers 3 and 4, the assigned area for beaching LCIs and LSMs, all ships had to beach on Sapo Point within an area of about 150 yards. The beach was a mass of heavy logs and debris which had not been clearly shown on reconnaissance photos. Extreme difficulty was encountered in clearing the beach to make it passable for vehicles unloading from landing ships. The first ship to beach was LSM 203, and with only one small bull dozer aboard, this ship was delayed in unloading due to conditions of the beach. LCI 701 unloaded personnel and gear at pier 3, and LSM 168 beached later alongside LSM 203.

An unscheduled delay (LST 574 could not raise her anchor) necessitated the beaching of LST 667 ahead of LST 574. As most of the beach clearing equipment and personnel were aboard LST 574, unloading on Red Beach progressed slowly until LST 574 arrived on the beach in early afternoon. Mobile equipment from LSTs was to be unloaded on Red Beach and reloaded in LSMs for transportation to Yellow Beach, on the mainland. LSMs for this purpose, for the most part, were to come from unloading their cargo on Yellow Beach.

Due to its small area Red Beach was congested when vehicles from only three LSTs, LST 667, LST 922 and LST 574, were unloaded the first day, due to non-availability of LSMs until dusk. This situation cleared up during the night when the three LSMs which arrived at dusk were loaded and departed for Yellow Beach at dawn.

The current was very heavy on flood and ebb tides. The set was south-east on flood tide and northwest on ebb tide. Difficulty in hitting the range markers for beaching slots was encountered under these conditions. LST 667, first to beach, was forced to reduce speed when two LSMs crossed her bow, thus causing her to hit pier one; however, the ship was not damaged.

During the first day while other LSTs were unloading vehicles, LSTs 584 and 751 discharged bulk cargo on to barges for transfer to Yellow Beach. Insufficient barges were assigned to handle all bulk in this manner, so these two ships completed unloading on Red Beach after unloading mobile cargo. LST 922 also was beached on Red Beach to finish unloading bulk cargo. All cargo was to be further transported to Yellow Beach.

All LSTs, except LST 667 which was to remain in area as casualty evacuation ship, were completely unloaded by 1700 on 11 June, and LSTs 584, 751 and 922 had loaded all White Beach LVTs for return to Morotai. LST 584 retracted from Red Beach after loading LVTs, and LSTs 751 and 922 retracted the following morning shortly after dawn.

On morning of 12 June, all mobile and a small amount of bulk cargo was transported from Red to Yellow Beach by LSMs. The balance of the bulk left on Red Beach was to be transported later by available craft and barges.

All ships of White Assault Unit assigned to return in departing convoy at 1600 on 12 June arrived in assigned anchorages before 1400 on that date.

Officer in Tactical Command for returning convoy was Commander LST Flotilla FIFTEEN.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Action Report - OBOE SIX Operation - Morotai to
Brunel Bay, Borneo.

PART III.

There was no firing by ships in White Assault Unit. The performance of ships and aircraft assigned to White Support Unit proved effective. Combined rocket, larger ships batteries, and bombs displayed well patterned mass destruction on the beach and in the beaching area.

PART IV.

There was no battle damage to our own forces in the White Assault Unit. The enemy suffered negligible damage because of the small amount of equipment in the area subject to damage.

PART V.

Special praise should be given to the well planned attack orders prepared by Commander Amphibious Group SIX and Commander LST Flotilla FIFTEEN. The work of subordinates was facilitated thru the completeness of these orders.

Communications planning was considered excellent, with particular mention to making available enough frequencies for each phase of the operation. Personnel involved in planning, operation and maintenance are all to be congratulated.

It was evident that the enemy had no intentions of defending the White Beach area. There was no equipment or personnel to establish the sign of any plan for resistance. This area evidenced the fact that there was a possible plan for servicing large ships on the piers and transporting by boats to and from the mainland. A large amount of approximately 12" pipe indicated a pipeline from the mainland to the island may have been planned for fueling large ships.

The task of clearing the beach of heavy logs and debris could have been greatly facilitated if all ships had at least one bull dozer aboard. This is recommended for future operations whenever possible. It is also recommended that air photos be taken at the extreme tides to give a true picture of beaching conditions and beaching area.

PART VI.

The performance of personnel was considered good under existing conditions. There was a prompt reaction to all orders and commands. The only casualty suffered in the White Beach area was one Australian dead and one American wounded. It is believed both casualties were caused by own fire.

A. E. FITZWILLIAM

Advance Copy to:
Cominch.

LOADING REPORT - OBOE SIX OPERATION - MOROTAI TO BRUNEL BAY, BORNEO.

ARMY OF NAVY UNITS ABOARD

3 June 1945


LIST No.	Cargo is Destined	Number of Enlisted Passengers	Number of Officer Passengers	Total Troops	Number of Vehicles	Tons Bulk Cargo	Tons Mobile Cargo
922	2/1 ME CO, Flame thrower PT2, 2/9 Armed REGT WHEP, 323 RADAR STA, 2/16 TPT PL (HY), 2/27 SUP DEP PL, 2/3 FD COY, 2/8 FD AME, 2/3 MCV, 2/16 FD COY, 2/26 SUP DEP 2/1 CCS, 2/8 DENTAL UNIT, 9 DIV CASH OFF, 9 DIV POSTAL UNIT, 9 DIV SAL UNIT, AACs	417	22	439	58	116	130
574	HQ 20 Aus Inf Bde, R.A.M. BEACH COMMANDO "C", #1 Party Air Sup.Sect., Det Sigs 9 Aust Div(att 20 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec., OP DET 3 AUST PIGEON SEC., det B Aust FS Sec., det B Aust FS Sec., det HQ 9 Aust Div., det 2/26 Aust Sup Depot Pl, det CIC, 2 AAPIU, det 34 Aust FS Sec.(EE), det 3 Aust Op Reports Team, det 2/17 Aust Inf Bn, ATIS det, Det 2 Aust MLI Ldg Gp, 41 Aust Sqn A/L Sec., 16 AOP det 83 Wing RAAF, 3 Aust Beach Sig Sec (AJF), 1 Pp "A" Coy 2/L Aust Fd Regt, Det.3 Aust Engr Sig Sec. att'd 2/3 Aust Fd Coy RAE., d et 9 Aust Div Pro Coy, Det BBCEAU, No.2 Air Sup Party (R) RAAF, 2/58 Aust LAD, SRD, det 2/13 Aust FD AMB, 2/17 Aust Inf Bn, "B" Aust Bomb. Troop, Pub.Rel.Field det 1 Aust Corps, HQ 2/6 Aust Sup Depot Coy AASC 48426, 2/16 Aust Tpt Pl, 20 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec., DET 2/18 Aust TPT PL, 2/8 Aust FD. AMB, Det 2/1 Aust Mech Eapt Coy, 2/8 Aust FD Regt. 2/64 Aust FD Regt., 2/64 LAD Personnel, One Sqn Sub Pk, 2/9 Aust Armd Regt Ord Fd Pk, Det 2/9 Aust Armd Regt Sig Tp, Det 2 Lt W/TS Sec, Sqn Sec 2/9 Aust Armd Regt Wk Ships, "A" Sqn 2/9 Aust Armd Regt.	443	33	476	48	119	334 1/2

ENCLOSURE (A)

LIST No.	ARMY OR NAVY UNITS ABOARD 3 June 1945	Beach For Which Cargo is Destined	Number of Enlisted Passengers	Number of Officer Passengers	Total Troops	Number of Vehicles	Tons Bulk Cargo	Tons Mobile Cargo
584	2/15 Aust Inf Bn, 2/8 Aust Fd Regt - det 15 Bty, 2/3 Aust Fd Reg - det 9 LAA Bty, 5/Aust Fd Survey Coy (AIF) 3 sec, 2/6 Aust, Sup Depot Coy HQ, 2/26 Aust Sup Depot Pl, 2/27 Aust Sup Depot Pl., 2/3 Aust Fd Coy RAE - det, Public Rel & Res, 727 American Amphib Tractor Bn.	Red-Yellow	419	21	440	43	136	348.5
667	727th Amphib Tractor Bn, RAN Beach Commando "G", 3 AUST. Beach Sig Sec (AIF), 2/118 AUST. BDE WKSP, AEME, 2/118 AUST. BDE Ord Fd Pk, 2/13 Aust Tpt Pl AASC, 2/3 Aust Fd Coy RAE - 2/1 Mech Sqpt. Coy RAE, 2/8 Aust Fd Regt, 2/15 Aust Inf Bn	Red-Yellow	428	23	451	41	125	26
751	B Sec FS Sec, 2/8 Aust FD Regt., 2/64 Aust LAD, 8 Aust Survey RAA (CAIF) & Met Sec., "B" Aust Bombardment TP, Det 2/3 Aust Fd Coy RAE, 20 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec, 2/15 Aust Inf Bn, 2/8 Aust Fd Amb, 2/58 Aust LAD, Det 34 Fd Security Sec (EE), 3 Aust Beach Sig Sec (AIF), RAN Beach Commando "C", British Borneo Civil Administration Unit, #4 Air Liaison Party (RAAF), 727 Amph Trac Bn (USA), (Observer USA).	Red-Yellow	448	28	476	34	120	274

ENCLOSURE (A)

CRUISING FORMATION No. 6



ENCLOSURE (B)

APPROACH FORMATION No. 6

